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Introduction:  
On April 12th 2018, the Financial Times published an article on Paris Saint-Germain’s financial 
situation following a formal investigation conducted by UEFA1 in accordance with the 
Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP)2. In its article the Financial Times states that European 
football executives were accusing the football club of “financial doping”.3 The club indeed 
headlined the sporting sections of global newspapers during the summer of 2017 with the 
signings of football players Neymar and Kylian M’Bappé for the equivalent of €400 million. 
The single transfer of Neymar showed the new character of football transfers with a deal 
estimated at €222 million.4 Until then, the most expensive transfer was estimated around €105 
million,5 hence elevating Neymar’s transfer to the most expensive purchase in football history. 
The case of PSG illustrates several trends currently occurring in the European football industry. 
Firstly, it is an example of the increasing number of foreign actors investing in European 
football (Madichie 1841). This trend started mainly in 2003 when the Russian oligarch Roman 
Abramovich purchased Chelsea F.C..6 Since then, investors from the United States have 
purchased Manchester United,7 Liverpool,8 AS Roma,9 and Olympique de Marseille 10in 
                                                        
1 Union of European Football Associations  
2 clubs participating to can spend up to €5 million more than they earn per assessment period (three years) 
3 ‘PSG ‘overstated’ sponsorships valued at €200m, says Uefa probe’, Financial Times 
4 ‘Neymar: Paris St-Germain Sign Barcelona Forward for World Record 222m Euros - BBC Sport.’ BBC News 
5  ‘Neymar: Paris St-Germain Sign Barcelona Forward for World Record 222m Euros - BBC Sport.’ BBC News 
6 ‘Business | Russian Businessman Buys Chelsea’, BBC News 
7 ‘Business | Glazer Wins Control of Man United’, BBC News 
8 ‘Liverpool Takeover Completed by US Company NESV’, BBC News 
9 ‘US Investor Buys Majority Stake in AS Roma’, Financial Times 
10 ‘Marseille: Frank McCourt Promises £180m Investment after Buying Ligue 1 Club’, BBC Sport
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France; investors from China have purchased AC Milan,11 and Inter Milan;12 investors from 
Qatar have purchased Malaga CF,13 and PSG;14 investors from Thailand have been related to 
Leicester City 15 and Manchester City,16 while investors from the UAE purchased Manchester 
City in 2008, from the former Thai owner of the club. Other actors have also been linked with 
European football since 2003 with Azerbaijan being linked with Atletico Madrid17 and RC 
Lens,18 and Red Bull creating a network of clubs with their involvement in Leipzig and 
Salzburg.19 The second aspect which this article illustrates is the willingness of the UEFA to 
enforce financial regulations on the clubs participating in European competitions.20 
Nevertheless, the research of this paper focuses on the first aspect aforementioned: foreign 
investment in the European Football Industry. The second aspect is developed in a chapter 
concerning the failed state branding of Qatar. Qatar is indeed the only country in the examples 
mentioned before to be directly involved in the governance of a club. While an entity related to 
the government of Abu Dhabi owns Manchester City, PSG is wholly owned by a subpart of 
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, QSI (Dorsey 423).  
                                                        
11 ‘AC Milan Sold for €740m to Chinese Consortium in Biggest-ever Far East Investment in European Game’, 
The Independent 
12 ‘Inter Milan's Chinese Owner in Talks to Expand Soccer Empire’, Bloomberg.com 
13 ‘Soccer-Qatari Sheikh Al-Thani Buys Malaga Football Club’, Reuters 
14 ‘Qatari Takeover Heralds New Dawn for Paris Saint-Germain’, BBC Sport 
15 ‘Thai Billionaire's Investment in Leicester City Pays Off’, The Wall Street Journal 
16 ‘Abu Dhabi Group Buys Manchester City from Former Thai Leader’, The New York Times 
17 ‘Azerbaijan's Sponsorship of Atlético Madrid Proves Spectacular Success’, The Guardian 
18 ‘RC Lens to Push Out Azerbaijani Ownership’, Futbolgrad 
19 ‘UEFA Clear RB Leipzig and Red Bull Salzburg to Play in Champions League following Ownership Issue’, 
FOX Sports 
20 ‘Financial fair play: all you need to know’, uefa.com  
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 This research aims to look at the state branding of Qatar in France. It takes place within 
the broader question of whether state branding could be successful. Is Qatar’s state branding 
through PSG in France successful? The research focuses on the case of PSG since football has 
been acknowledged to be an essential element of popular culture and the most popular sport 
globally (Garcia and Meier 852; Garcia and Amara 2). The aim of this research is relevant to 
fields of academia and the practice of IR. Concerning academia, there is currently a lack of 
research concerning the purchase of sports clubs and franchises by state-related actors. The 
current literature focuses mostly on the organisations of major sporting events, such as the 
Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. Some research has been conducted on the strategy of jersey 
sponsorship and the general ‘football diplomacy’ engaged by Qatar (Antwi-Boateng 45). 
However, the subject of state strategy in football ownership has received little academic 
attention – owing, in part, to the recentness of the topic and the lack of literature on state 
branding (Dinnie 13).  
Concerning the practice of IR and the relevance for practitioners, this research coincides 
with the increasing globalisation of European football. Football often becomes a stage in which 
political or societal norms and ideas are highlighted, which sheds light on specific international 
affairs and relations. The Irish and American national jerseys represented the struggles in favour 
of LGBTQ+ rights in June 2018,21 Didier Drogba put a shirt in commemoration of Nelson 
Mandela’s death,22 the celebrations of Xhaka and Shaqiri during a 2018 FIFA World Cup game 
against Serbia illustrated the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo23 for instance. The varied 
attempts by Qatar to promote its brand is interesting as it shows a desire to become an 
international player since the coup implemented by Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in 1995 
                                                        
21 ‘Ireland and US football teams add rainbow LGBT flag to kit’, bbc.co.uk 
22 ‘Didier Drogba defiant over T-shirt tribute to Nelson Mandela’, the Independent 
23 ‘Xherdan Shaqiri and Granit Xhaka Could Face Punishment for 'political' Goal Celebrations’, The Independent 
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(Peterson 748). Qatar’s involvement in football and more particularly in France is, therefore, 
interesting to analyse.  
 To determine whether Qatar was successful in its state branding in France, this research 
is divided into four main parts. The first part offers an analysis of two concepts – state branding 
and sports diplomacy – which are vital to this research. These concepts have to be analysed and 
discussed in order to understand the strategy of Qatar in France with its use of PSG. By looking 
at these concepts, the author of this research hopes to establish which factors were crucial for a 
state to brand itself successfully and which factors could undermine such a strategy. The second 
chapter focuses on the successful aspects of Qatar’s state branding in France. The newspapers 
‘Le Monde’ and ‘L'Équipe’ present the positive portrayal of Qatar here through the acquisition 
of the club and its symbolic value, the signing of prominent football figures, and the progressive 
reintegration of supporters within the realm of the club. The third chapter tackles the negative 
aspects of Qatar’s portrayal in France. These include: poor communication from the club, the 
perception of a lack of fair play on both financial and sporting fields, linkages between the 
emirate and two corruptions scandals, and finally a `perceived` disrespect of so-called “French 
values.” The fourth part links these findings of the analysis of Le Monde and L'Équipe with the 
academic literature on state branding to give a broader perspective on the success of Qatar. The 
findings have to be linked with the existing research done on Qatar’s foreign policy to put the 
results of this research into perspective. 
Literature Review: 
State branding has to be considered in relation to the broader concept of soft power developed 
by Nye and public diplomacy. Nye is the scholar associated with the concept of soft power, 
often perceived as its conceptual founder. However, Nye argues that while the concept is 
perceived as new, it was already acknowledged in 1939 by E.H. Carr (Nye 82). Although the 
concept of soft power is recent, its implications have historical roots. Nye indeed illustrates this 
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point by mentioning the historical past of France and Prussia (81). Interestingly enough, Nye 
uses the example of France to argue that culture enhanced France’s power (81). In the light of 
Qatar’s state’s investments in popular culture in France throughout the ownership of PSG and 
the development of the broadcasting network BeIn Sports, it seems reasonable that the 
ownership of PSG and BeIn exemplify substantial pillars of Qatar’s attempt of developing its 
soft power. It makes state branding a component of soft power. Nye defines soft power as 
“simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes” (82) In another publication, 
Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments” (256). However, based on the definition of Nye, Qatar is distilling its 
hard power into soft power by owning the tools of soft power.  
The definition of soft power can be associated with the objectives of state branding as 
Dinnie summarises them. Dinnie summarises the core objectives of state branding in three 
points. According to Dinnie, states engage in such a strategy firstly to attract tourists, secondly 
to stimulate inward investments and thirdly to boost exports (17). Another objective for states 
to use such as a strategy is to change the international perception of the country. To outline the 
purpose of state branding in simpler terms, its main objective is to make the state more attractive 
to potential customers. Thus, the recent linkages established by various media outlets on Qatar’s 
support for organisations, widely perceived as “terrorist”, would incentivize such a strategy 
(Samuel-Azran et all, 1101-02). Krzyzaniak summarises the strategy in one sentence by 
declaring that the “audience perception is the determining factor” (3).  
One of the complexities regarding state branding lies in the lack of theorisation on the 
topic. The concept of branding is deeply embedded in marketing studies and therefore focuses 
on company branding (Krzyzaniak 3). However, some aspects concerning company branding 
can also be applied to state branding. Brands are affected by popular culture and societal trends 
(Dinnie 14), something which can be seen in the public perception of states. A core aspect of 
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branding is to differentiate one brand from the other. Concerning Qatar, Peterson argues that it 
was crucial for Qatar to make itself distinguishable from its neighbours (748). It can explain 
that, while Qatar has used football jersey sponsorship as a state branding strategy, likewise 
Dubai with Emirates, the emirate has centred its strategy on the purchase and development of 
PSG. However, this latter resembles the strategy used by Abu Dhabi and its purchase of 
Manchester City.  
While the literature emphasises the ‘natural’ soft power of certain major states such as 
France or the United States (Krzyzaniak 5), state branding seems to have become a crucial 
strategy for small states. Scholars encourage small states to develop non-military instruments 
since they do not have the capabilities bigger states might have (Sulaib 29). It seems therefore 
crucial for the small Gulf states to engage in state branding to ‘survive’ or ‘exist’ with Saudi 
Arabia and Iran as neighbouring countries.  
Different strategies can be used by states to brand themselves. As Peterson argues, it is 
crucial for regional players to differentiate themselves from their neighbours (748). The critical 
component of Qatar’s strategy has been Al Jazeera since 1996 while Dubai has been using its 
state-owned company Emirates to promote itself internationally. Both strategies aim at 
presenting their respective emirate as ‘modern’ in comparison to the rest of the Middle East 
(Sulaib 30). One can see the direct repercussions of state branding strategies in the current 
diplomatic crises occurring in the Gulf between Qatar and its neighbours. Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt indeed consider Al Jazeera as a threat. Al Jazeera is deemed to be a reliable of source of 
information in the Middle East, which seems threatening to Qatar’s neighbours as its reporting 
would be considered as an extension of Qatar’s ambitions in the region. Both Dubai and Qatar 
have expanded their state branding strategy to European football with Emirates sponsoring 
several football clubs such as Real Madrid, AC Milan, PSG, Hamburg SV, and Arsenal while 
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Qatar extended the Al Jazeera network with the creation of BeIn Sports.24 However, the case 
of Qatar is interesting considering it purchased PSG in 2011. The involvement of state actors 
in football links the concept of state branding with sports diplomacy.  
Like state branding, sports diplomacy is merely one aspect of a soft power strategy 
which a state can use. With the increasing audiences throughout the last decades, football has 
become a matter of diplomacy (Boniface 87). As mentioned previously, the concepts of sports 
diplomacy and state branding are closely linked. Individual states, such as Qatar, use sports 
diplomacy as part of their state branding strategy. State branding is the primary reason states 
use sports (Allison and Monnington 107). While the core values of the country are argued to be 
crucial for a successful state branding strategy, this is not necessarily the case when sports 
diplomacy is involved. Sports diplomacy moderates the conditions for state branding to be 
successful. However, this last point is not entirely agreed on by scholars. Some authors, such 
as Antwi-Boateng have followed a traditional line of thought in which these core values are 
essential for a successful strategy. It follows the idea that state branding follows the same 
principle as company branding in which a brand has to deliver the promises it pushes to be 
associated with (Dinnie 16). Even in this situation, rather than focusing on the actual core values 
of the states, we should focus on which values the state tries to be associated with. Black and 
Peacock make it clear that the core values are not crucial in sports diplomacy when they mention 
the importance of sports diplomacy for authoritarian regimes (2). In the cases related to football, 
one can look at the cases of China, Russia, Azerbaijan, the UAE and Qatar investing through 
different means in European football. Nevertheless, one of the aspects which is agreed upon in 
sports diplomacy is about image building. While the idea is appealing in theory, the success of 
image building remains difficult to be observed directly. As it is a matter of public perception, 
the success of image building cannot be quantified empirically. Nevertheless, the strategy of 
                                                        
24 ‘Al Jazeera Sport Rebrands as BeIN Sport’, ArabianBusiness.com. 
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Qatar is already being considered as a failure because of the situation concerning migrant 
workers and the infringement of their human rights (Krzyzaniak 2). In his paper, Krzyzaniak 
argues that the UAE has been more successful in their strategy than Qatar (2) which is 
interesting considering that both emirates used the same ‘kafala system’ which has been 
denounced by the international community and NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch.25  
As the case concerning the human right abuses in Qatar shows, the literature concerning 
sports diplomacy focuses mainly on the organisation of major sporting events, namely the 
summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. These events are analysed within the concept of 
state branding. However, there are also other forms of sports diplomacy which are discussed in 
the literature, namely sponsorship and the purchase of clubs/franchises. The Olympics and the 
FIFA World Cup are the most obvious ways for countries to advertise themselves globally 
considering the attention these events generate. As mentioned, a state branding strategy might 
not be successful. Krzyzaniak displays the concept of ‘soft disempowerment’ in case of a 
counterproductive attempt at building a thriving state brand (4). The concept is also described 
by Brannagan and Giulianotti as occasions which “offend or alienate others, leading to a loss 
of attractiveness or influence” (706). The Olympics in Sydney and London are considered as 
highly successful by scholars while the Olympics in Sochi, Beijing and Rio are considered as 
not successful in the case of state branding. Interestingly enough, the Olympics in Sochi and 
Beijing are argued to be non-successful because of the intolerant image Russia and China 
showed to the world (Samuel-Azran et al., 1103). This point has to be moderated since it seems 
that the intolerant image of these regimes is mostly portrayed in Western societies. 
Nevertheless, the argument made by Samuel-Azran et al. supports the idea by which values 
remain essential for state branding, even in the case of sports diplomacy.  
                                                        
25 ‘UAE: Domestic Workers' Rights Bill A Step Forward’, Human Rights Watch and ‘Qatar World Cup 
Workers' Rights to Improve with End of Kafala System, Claims Union’, The Guardian 
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The case of PSG in this context is noteworthy considering that Qatar is hosting the FIFA 
World Cup in 2022 and purchased the club in 2011. The link between state branding and sports 
diplomacy in the case of PSG is well summarized by Ervine as he declares that “since the 
takeover of PSG in 2011 by Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), the focus on the local or even the 
national has become less important as the club has set to establish itself on the European and 
international stage” (73). Ervine implies that the objective of Qatar might not be France, but 
rather a global audience, which would contradict the current perception on state branding. State 
branding indeed suggests that the targeted audience is the country in which the investment is 
made. Ervine here mentions the European continental club tournaments and makes it clear that 
the investment in PSG takes place in the broader European football industry.  
Sport can be a natural source of prestige according to Allison and Monnington (112). 
They argue that sport can only produce power marginally; however, one has to consider that 
their research was published in 2002, before the globalisation of the European football industry.   
Methodology: 
To analyse the results of Qatar’s state branding strategy in France, and more particularly in 
sports, it is essential to look at the discourse related to Qatar in France. As it is mentioned by 
Grix and Brannagan when they refer to the difficulty to look at concrete examples of state 
branding (251), the same can be applied in the case of the discourse concerning Qatar. Grix and 
Brannagan argue that research related to soft power, while being academically appealing, was 
difficult, due to the theoretical ambiguity of the theories related to it (251). Looking at the 
discourse related to state branding allows analysing the results of state branding in a country 
concretely. For this research, statements by politicians and public debates led by politicians 
were not chosen despite their influence on the construction of public discourses. This is due to 
the sensitive subject of Islam in the current French political discourse and the rise of the Front 
National in recent domestic and European elections. The Front National, which focuses 
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significantly on this topic, obtained 21.30% in the Presidential elections in 201726 while 
obtaining 17.90% in 2012.27 In addition to Islam, the far-right party also commented on the 
nature of the new owners of PSG and advocated for the nationalisation of the club.28 The author 
of this research does not expect significant findings when using this approach. Instead of 
focusing on the construction of public discourse by politicians, the author of this paper decided 
to look at the construction of public discourses by national newspapers.  
To summarise the objective of this research in simple terms, it aimed to see whether 
state branding is successful. By looking at newspapers, the author hopes for a more objective 
perspective towards the emirate than by looking at statements done by politicians. Objectivity 
cannot be achieved by analysing newspapers. The nature of this research is embedded in 
subjectivity since it aims at studying the perception of a country through the mean of popular 
culture. However, the intentions behind statements of politicians or journalist diverge. 
Statements done by politicians are indeed intended to attract or consolidate an electorate, 
whereas newspapers are depended on sales. Newspapers are, thus, less ideologically based and 
can, therefore, offer a more neutral view on topics than politicians. For this reason, the 
newspapers selected had to be recognised as reasonably neutral and national. ‘Le Monde’ was 
chosen as it is one of the most sold daily newspaper in France and is considered to be the 
newspaper which is the most read in the country.29 An estimated number of 270,000 copies of 
Le Monde were sold daily in France in 2016. It is also the newspaper which focuses the most 
on international affairs in contrast to ‘Le Parisien Aujourd’hui en France’, which focuses 
                                                        
26 ‘French presidential election: first round results in charts and maps’, The Guardian 
27 ‘Marine Le Pen's 17.9% Is Not a Breakthrough for the Far Right.’ The Guardian 
28 ‘Qatar: Nationaliser Le Paris Saint-Germain, La Drôle De Réponse Du FN à La Crise Diplomatique.’ Le 
Huffington Post 
29 ‘National Daily Newspaper: Most Popular Newspapers France 2016 | Statistic’, Statista 
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mostly on daily affairs and ‘Le Figaro’, which has a special financial rubric. ‘L'Équipe’ was 
chosen as it is the leading daily newspaper specialised in sports and remains one of the most 
read French newspapers as well. Around 230,000 copies of L'Équipe were sold daily in France 
in 2016. While newspapers do have an impact on the construction of discourse, their impact is 
limited. Le Monde and L'Équipe do, therefore, not represent the perception of Qatar in France 
entirely. Nevertheless, as two major French newspapers, they shape public discourse. The 
image of Qatar represented in these newspapers is, therefore, essential.  Van Dijk argues that 
journalists played a critical role in Critical Discourse Analysis, by having control over mass 
media discourse (20). As the research treats the state branding strategy of Qatar through the 
case of a football club, the selection of these two newspapers seems appropriate.  
For this research, the author selected articles from these two newspapers, which 
contained the keywords “PSG” and “Qatar”. The time frame chosen was from July 1st, 2011 
until June 30th, 2017. Since QSI purchased the club officially on June 30th, 2011, it seemed 
rational to start the research from the day after the purchase of the club. June 30th, 2017 was 
determined as the end-date of the research for two reasons. First, by the time this research was 
being completed, the 2017/2018 season had not yet ended. Second, June is the last month of a 
football season while July represents the beginning of the new season. In point of fact, the 
contract of players ends on June 30th. 78 articles from Le Monde and 48 articles from L'Équipe 
were therefore analysed and used for this research.  
The objective of this research is to see whether state branding is successful or not. To 
answer this question, it seems crucial to analyse two elements regarding the articles chosen. 
The first element which needs to be analysed concerns the way Qatar was perceived in Le 
Monde and L'Équipe. The second element concerns the evolution of how Qatar was perceived 
in the newspapers. A successful state branding would improve the perception of the state by the 
foreign audience. Therefore, in addition to looking at the terminology used, the change of 
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terminology is also analysed. This analysis follows a logic related to Critical Discourse 
Analysis. By looking at Le Monde and L'Équipe, the objective is to look at how two major 
newspapers, which can be described as dominant following Van Dijk’s argumentation, can 
shape the opinion of the readers. The terminology used in both the headlines and the articles is 
analysed. The findings are then presented in two main chapters, treating the successful and 
failed aspects of Qatar’s state branding through the case of PSG. Each of these chapters are 
organized through sub-themes, such as the relation between the club and the supporters, the 
signing of major players such as David Beckham and Zlatan Ibrahimović, the symbolic aspect 
of the acquisition of the club by Qatar, the poor communication of the club concerning affairs 
related to its players, the lack of financial and sporting fair play, corruption, and more broadly 
the disrespect of so-called ‘French values’.   
 For the sake of this research, the company branding of PSG is linked with the state 
branding of Qatar. The logic behind it goes as follow: the evolution of one will affect the other. 
Thani and Heenan show the logic behind it when they use the example of the company 
‘Emirates’, as a mean to promote the UAE and more specifically Dubai (1018). Audiences 
thought the term ‘Emirates’ meant the UAE rather than the company (Krzyzaniak 11). The link 
between company and state branding is also emphasised by Ginesta and Eugenio. According to 
them, governments can use companies and organisations to brand themselves through the mean 
of football (Ginesta and Eugenio 226). The concept of state branding is heavily based on 
marketing studies. By becoming a company owned by QSI, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, in 
2011, PSG started being a subpart of Qatar’s broader state branding. A positive development 
of PSG’s company branding would, therefore, lead to a positive state branding for Qatar, 
whereas a negative development of PSG would lead to a negative development of Qatar’s 
public image. It was possible to make such a connection since the entity which bought PSG on 
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June 30th 2011 is a part of Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund (Thani and Heenan 1019). The 
branding aspect of Qatar with PSG is acknowledged by Samuel-Azran et al. (1105).  
For this research, French is the language used in Le Monde and L'Équipe. However, 
since this paper is written in English, the author of this paper quotes the newspapers in English. 
Being a French native speaker, the author of this paper provides these translations himself. 
Nevertheless, the original quotes can be found in the footnotes on every page.  
Successful State Branding 
Qatar’s involvement in PSG is portrayed positively by Le Monde and L'Équipe based on three 
aspects: the symbolic nature of the acquisition of the club by Qatar, and more significantly its 
financial investment, the acquisition of key players, which have positive repercussions for the 
sporting performances of the club and the marketing of the club, and finally the approach which 
the Qatari administration has had with the progressive reintegration of ultras which were 
excluded from the club before the acquisition in 2011. The combination of these three topics 
leads to a successful positive branding of Qatar in France. Nevertheless, this chapter only 
develops one aspect of Qatar’s state branding. The following chapter indeed tackles on the 
negative portrayal of the emirate in the two newspapers. Therefore, this chapter needs to be 
contrasted with the chapter on the adverse outcomes of Qatar’s involvement in PSG to make a 
definitive analysis of the repercussions of Qatar’s involvement in PSG on the emirate’s state 
branding. 
Acquisition  
Le Monde and L'Équipe portrayed the purchase of PSG by Qatar as a victory for its symbolic 
value. The nature of the new owner (Arab and Muslim) and the far-right past of numerous 
supporters of the club30 made the purchase of PSG by QSI a successful event for French sports. 
                                                        
30  ‘Supporters Du PSG: "Une Violence Qui N'existe Nulle Part Ailleurs".’ LExpress.fr 
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Debates concerning Islam and immigration are indeed present in the recent debates in French 
political debates. The Front National, which focuses significantly on these topics, obtained 
17.90% in the Presidential elections in 2012 while obtaining 10.44% in 2007.31 After the first 
official game played at ‘home’ by PSG after the purchase in August 2011, Le Monde headlined 
by saying that “Despite its defeat at home, PSG wins against racism.”32 Le Monde mentions 
the far-right past of some supporters of the club and shows the dilemma for some supporters 
struggling between being enthusiastic for the future of the club and the Arabic nature of the 
new club owners. The dilemma concerning the nature of the owners is shown at the end of the 
article, when the author refers to a declaration by the Minister of Sports, Chantal Jouanno, who 
is reported saying that she preferred that the club would remain French, forgetting that the 
team’s previous owner, Colony Capital, was American.33 For some supporters interviewed by 
the newspaper, the purchase of the club by Qatar was considered as ‘a victory of antiracism’.3435 
The article also mentions a fan who declares that “The Qataris, they are here for the good of 
the club, to give it a new dimension”. 36  
L'Équipe mentions an event when the Emir of Qatar invited the presidents of the other 
clubs from the league at the French Tennis Open.37 This event illustrates another aspect of the 
symbolic facet of the acquisition of the club.  While the newspaper did not put a big emphasis 
on the event, as it is the only publication related to the topic, it shows that Qatar showed respect 
to the other clubs which PSG competes with. The symbolic aspect of having the head of state 
                                                        
31 ‘Marine Le Pen's 17.9% Is Not a Breakthrough for the Far Right.’ The Guardian 
32 « Malgré sa défaite à domicile, le PSG remporte une Victoire contre le racisme’ » 
33 ‘Malgré sa défaite à domicile, le PSG remporte une Victoire contre le racisme’, Le Monde 
34 “une victoire de l’antiracisme” 
35 Malgré sa défaite à domicile, le PSG remporte une Victoire contre le racisme, Le Monde 
36 “Les Qataris sont là pour le bien du club, pour redonner une dimension” 
37 ‘L’émir du Qatar reçoit la L1 à Roland-Garros’, L'Équipe 
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inviting the presidents of the other clubs makes the state branding aspect clear. It might not 
have been the prime intention of Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani; the fact that the event led to a 
newspaper article makes it clear that the emirate wanted to be portrayed positively, either by 
the presidents or the newspaper’s audience.  
Politicians and football supporters alike challenged the image of Qatar in the aftermath of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Le Monde published an article titled ‘Fillon and Le Maire target 
Qatar, which is accused of financing terrorism’38 when L'Équipe mentioned anti-Qatari 
movements in Corsica during a football game.39 Nevertheless, Le Monde showed that Qatar 
wanted to be portrayed differently with its article ‘Al-Khelaïfi participated at the protest in 
Paris’.40 It showed a willingness of Qatar to be portrayed as a state respecting the local 
traditions in France rather than a state financing terrorism. While Nasser Al-Khelaïfi41 was not 
a head of state such as some of the other participants to the march, he is associated with the 
state of Qatar, since he represented the interests of the state through PSG and BeIn Sports.42  
At the end of the 2015/2016 season, Le Monde wrote an extensive article on the 
accomplishment of the club domestically that season, showing the development of the team 
since the purchase of the club.43 Never had a French club won the league so early, a success 
which even the coach considered laborious to repeat. Le Monde indeed quoted Laurent Blanc44 
                                                        
38 « Fillon and Le Maire ciblent le Qatar, accusé de financer le terrorisme » 
39 ‘Une banderole anti-Qatar déployée à Furiani’, L'Équipe 
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who declared that “I do not know if we will be able to make this route again one day”.4546 
Nevertheless, the focus was put on the team rather than the administration of the club or its 
owners.  
The 4-0 win against FC Barcelona in the Champions League in 2017 was praised by the 
media. Articles such as ‘Champions League: the achievement of PSG against FC Barcelona’47 
and ‘PSG (finally) enters a new dimension’48 outline the apparent prowess of the club against 
a major European club. Le Monde portrayed the game as “The benchmark game of PSG under 
the QSI era.”4950 The game was supposed to demonstrate the new level which the club had 
acquired under QSI ownership. It is shown with the quote ‘PSG finally entered a new 
dimension’.5152 The game was also praised as it justified the investment strategy of QSI since 
the purchase of the club. Le Monde mentions the “pharaonic” budget of the club for the 
2016/2017 season.5354  
Transfers 
The purchase of new football players also led to a positive state branding for Qatar. The rumours 
concerning the arrival of David Beckham in Paris are an example of this aspect. Le Monde 
covered positively the potential arrival of Beckham in January 2012. The newspaper published 
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two articles named ‘David Beckham, PSG’s new icon?’55 and ‘David Beckham at Paris or the 
end of the financial equity’.56 David Beckham was presented as being more than a football 
player. Le Monde reported a citation from Leonardo, the director of football of the club, saying 
“The door is open, he is more than a football player, he is a brand, a pop-star”.5758 The 
branding aspect of David Beckham in Paris was also emphasised by the title of a paragraph 
named ‘Ambassador player.’5960 Despite the debates on the decency of his salary, the arrival of 
David Beckham was also portrayed as positive for French football. David Beckham was the 
getaway for French football to enter the Asian market.61 Even though Beckham went to Paris 
one year later, the rumours concerning him showed for the media the new dimension PSG just 
acquired.  
The continuing involvement of Qatar in PSG helped in the fostering of a positive image of 
the country. L'Équipe published an article named ‘Paris changes galaxy’62 to illustrate the 
impact Qatar has had on the development of the club. Le Monde followed the same trope when 
they released the article named ‘PSG’s metamorphosis’.63 On the one hand, L'Équipe focused 
on the sporting aspect and praised PSG for now being able to attract major football players. The 
citation “the club from the capital has definitely changed galaxy Saturday evening with the 
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formalisation of Thiago Silva’s transfer”6465 illustrates the apparent new dimension gained by 
the club by acquiring the Brazilian player, described as PSG’s “first star”.6667 Le Monde, on 
the other hand, outlined the new image PSG gained after winning the national championship 
(Ligue 1) in May 2013, the first one since the purchase of the club by QSI. While the failure of 
the club to win all the domestic cups is developed in the article as well, the main focus is on the 
new nature of the club, which has to become “a global brand”68 according to Le Monde.69 This 
new aspect of the club is mentioned when ‘old’ supporters are interviewed and declare that 
“PSG is considered as a brand for foreign tourists to buy jerseys”.7071 This illustrates the new 
dimension the club had acquired. While some supporters felt left out, a subject which is 
developed in further details at the end of this chapter, it shows the branding strategy adopted 
by QSI.  
The 2012/2013 saw the arrival of players such as Zlatan Ibrahimović and David Beckham 
to PSG. Their arrivals were praised by the French press. Le Monde showed it by publishing two 
articles named ‘”Beck’s”, the new front display of the PSG franchise’72 and ‘Zlatan 
Ibrahimović, the dynamiter of PSG.’73 The transfer of Zlatan Ibrahimović to PSG was 
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considered as a transfer to increase the quality of the team. It was illustrated when the journalist 
argued that “the thirty years old represents a decisive argument for Parisian leaders willing to 
justify an expensive summer recruitment.”7475 On the other hand, the arrival of David Beckham 
during the January transfer period for only half a season was perceived as a marketing strategy 
for the club, and therefore Qatar as well. The article starts by explaining the impact which the 
arrival of certain Brazilian players to PSG has had on the audiences of the Ligue 1 in Brazil.76 
The article then continues by explaining that the arrival of David Beckham was supposed to 
increase the audience of the Ligue 1 globally, which was under the responsibility of the 
president of Al Jazeera Sports and BeIn Sports, Nasser Al-Khelaïfi, who was also the president 
of PSG. Al-Khelaïfi was indeed also the president of BeIn Sports, which was responsible of the 
broadcasting rights of the Ligue 1 globally. However, the objective for the club, more than 
increasing the audience for the Ligue 1 abroad, was to export the brand ‘PSG’ internationally.77 
To do so, Le Monde quotes the general manager of PSG, Jean Claude Blanc, who declared “we 
are creating a global brand within sports.”78 The article also argued that the brand David 
Beckham was far more developed than the brand PSG at this point.79 
The period related to the end of Zlatan Ibrahimović’s contract with the club also shows the 
success of Qatar’s branding strategy. Despite the inability of the club to win any title on the 
European level, Zlatan Ibrahimović was praised for the national success and the new stature the 
club gained during his presence. Le Monde framed it by presenting him as ‘The icon Zlatan, 
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“king of excessiveness”80 and by describing his final game as ‘The “jubilee” of Zlatan 
Ibrahimović with PSG’.81 Zlatan Ibrahimović was presented as a success for the club and its 
owners by Le Monde, both in sportive and economic fields.82 Even François Hollande 
commented on the departure of Ibrahimović after his last game, saying “He gave a new 
dimension to the Ligue 1. He almost crushed it with his talent”.8384 Le Monde showed the 
special nature of Ibrahimović’s personality, when it described him as “king of excessiveness”,85 
but also showed the popularity of the player in France. When mentioning the coming game 
from Ibrahimović’s national team in France, Le Monde claimed that Ibrahimović “will 
monopolise the applause”8687 for instance.  
Supporters  
The 2012/2013 season ended with PSG winning the Ligue 1 after failing to do so the previous 
season. The club had the intention to celebrate the title with its supporters on the Trocadero 
square next to the Eiffel Tower. Due to violent clashes between Parisian supporters, the 
celebration did not go as expected. The administration of the club condemned the violence and 
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showed support for the police forces, which was perceived positively by L'Équipe. The 
newspaper quoted the terms “disaster”88 and “shame”89 applied by Nasser Al-Khelaïfi.90  
The reintegration of some of the ultras who were involved in the Trocadero events of 2013 
was positively highlighted by the press. Le Monde mentioned it in two articles, namely ‘PSG: 
the return of ultras in the Parc des Princes is becoming materialised’91 and ‘PSG-Barcelona: 
the smooth return of Ultras in the Parc des Princes’.92 While ultras were forbidden to enter the 
Parc des Princes since 2010, the club is depicted as wanting to integrate these fans in its stadium 
in a progressive manner. It was portrayed by Le Monde as a willingness of the club done in 
accordance with the police authorities of Paris.93 In another article on the topic, the president 
of PSG Al-Khelaïfi is praised for his involvement in the reintegration of the ultras. Le Monde 
interviewed a sociologist specialised on football ultras who claimed that the reintegration of 
ultras was crucial in the branding of PSG.94 As it is later developed in this paper, Qatar is often 
confronted with what media consider as local traditions. The reintegration of some ultras is 
therefore considered as positive for the club and the administration since it showed a certain 
empathy towards a fringe of supporters, which were not included in the development plan of 
QSI. However, other aspects, which are considered to be as local traditions by the media, do 
not allow Qatar to be entirely successful in its branding. These aspects are mainly corruption, 
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human rights abuses and financial fair play. The above-mentioned topics are non-exhaustive 
and only represent a fragment of the reasons which participate in the soft disempowerment of 
Qatar. It illustrates the argument made by Antwi-Boateng which consider values as crucial for 
a successful state branding (48) and goes against the position of Black and Peacock on this 
matter (2).  
Failed state branding 
While the involvement of Qatar through QSI in PSG has been portrayed in Le Monde and 
L'Équipe as explicit state branding in a favourable eye, concerning topics such as the acquisition 
of the club and its symbolic aspects for France, the acquisition of significant players which 
showed the willingness of Qatar to invest in France, and the strategy of the new administration 
to deal with new and old fans. However, some aspects of the state branding strategy of Qatar 
have also been portrayed as negative by the same newspapers. To be more precise, Qatar has 
been portrayed negatively throughout four central themes which are developed in this chapter. 
The four themes are: communication, lack of sporting and financial fair play, corruption, and a 
broader disrespect of French values. These four themes are related to topics which were 
developed in the first chapter of this research. Indeed, the state branding of Qatar in France has 
been portrayed as such by the French press. However, the state branding can also be negative, 
thus explaining the term “soft disempowerment” (Krzyzaniak 4; Brannagan and Giulianotti 
706).  
Values/Bad Communication  
Qatar is portrayed as an actor who does not respect French values, or at least as an actor who 
does not fit in the French society entirely. While the financial capabilities of the club were 
acknowledged, as the portrayal of some players showed, some of their repercussions were 
portrayed negatively in the press. The financial aspect of Qatar was outlined by Le Monde in 
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an article comparing the French club with Manchester City.95 The two clubs were presented as 
taking part in a strategy of both Qatar and the UAE to brand their emirates. It is first mentioned 
in the introductory paragraph, saying that “The shadow of Qatar and Abu Dhabi is present in 
the second-leg game between Manchester City and Paris-Saint Germain in the quarter-final”.96 
The French media criticises the English sporting press for overlooking the nature of Abu Dhabi 
and the violation of human rights occurring in the emirate. Le Monde argues that the situation 
was worse in Abu Dhabi than in Qatar and that both emirates were using their respective 
European club as a mean to attract tourists, illustrating the importance of how the emirates are 
portrayed in the countries they are investing.97  
The riots which occurred on the Trocadero square during PSG’s celebration of their first 
national title since the purchase of the club by QSI led to Le Monde headlining “PSG trapped 
in its communication operation”.9899 The newspaper outlined the reasons why the club decided 
to organise such an event before explaining that the repercussions of the riot would be on the 
city of Paris and France rather than Qatar. 100However, the newspaper acknowledges the 
responsibility of Qatar, and more particularly the size of their investment in a short amount of 
time. A marketing expert questioned by Le Monde declared that “the money from the Qataris 
                                                        
95 ‘Manchester City-PSG : le « golfico » de la Ligue des champions’, Le Monde 
96 “l’ombre du Qatar et d’Abu Dhabi plane sur le match retour entre Manchester City et le Paris-Saint-Germain 
en quart de finale” 
97 ‘Manchester City-PSG : le « golfico » de la Ligue des champions’, Le Monde 
98 ‘Le PSG pris au piège de son opération de communication’, Le Monde  
99 “Le PSG pris au piège de son opération de communication” 
100 “Des stars comme Ibrahimovic et Beckham, un décor de carte postale avec la Tour Eiffel en arrière-plan, et 
une dizaine de milliers de supporters pour les applaudir” – “Stars such as Ibrahimovic and Beckham, a postcard 
setting with the Eiffel Tower in the background, and ten thousands supporters to applaud them”  
Herbreteau 26 
exert a feeling of repulsion and fascination on French people. It is a reaction to the economic 
situation of France”.101  
L'Équipe also argued that the events were portrayed as being French in the Qatari press.102 
The argumentation lies in the fact that the rioters came from the ‘banlieues’ and had, therefore, 
nothing to do with Qatar. The portrayal of the event in such ways give the reader the feeling 
that Qatar does not take responsibility for the events. While, as it was developed in the previous 
paragraph, Al-Khelaïfi supported the French state, the general portrayal of Qatar during the 
events shows that the emirate is not interested in taking the blame for negative outputs due to 
their involvement.  
Another event led to PSG and its administration to be portrayed in a negative eye by the 
press. In September 2016, Serge Aurier, playing for the club since 2014, was condemned by a 
court for violence against a police officer.103 While the newspaper mentions the official support 
of the club for the player, it also reminds the reader of the previous event of Serge Aurier which 
affected the image of the club. Aurier previously insulted some staff members and players on 
the social media ‘Périscope’. For Le Monde, the club was harsher on Aurier the first time during 
the ‘Périscope’ than during the second affair.104  
The explicit state branding is mentioned in the press when the agreements between the club 
and the QTA (Qatar Tourism Authority) are mentioned. The agreements are mentioned in the 
article comparing Manchester City and PSG105 and in an article implying that the club was 
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pressured by the French National Assembly.106 PSG was indeed accused by the National 
Assembly to have signed a fake sponsoring contract with QTA which would mean that “PSG 
does not respect fair-play, boosts its accounts not to lose money and deserve to be 
sanctioned”.107  
While David Beckham ended up signing for the club in January 2013, the failure of the club 
to sign him the year before led to the press discrediting PSG. The press indeed announced the 
arrival of Beckham before the club announced that Beckham decided to stay in Los Angeles. 
While family reasons are presented to be the reason for David Beckham not joining the French 
club, Le Monde also argued that the trainer, Carlo Ancelotti, was not enthusiastic about signing 
the player.108 According to L'Équipe, the player had the intention to sign;109 however, the 
newspaper also announced that the player was on the verge of signing a new contract with his 
club in Los Angeles.  
The failure in signing Beckham in 2012 can be considered as PSG lacking significance in 
Europe compared to other clubs. To develop its international standing, it is crucial for the club 
to perform well in the Champions League, which is also the primary objective for the club.110 
However, the club has been underperforming, according to the press. In 2016, Le Monde 
headlined with ‘The big waste of the “Zlatan generation”’.111 The recurrence of the 
underperformance is outlined when the journalist declared that “PSG has been eliminated 
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again”.112113 The topic is again mentioned when the newspaper analysed the three seasons 
where Laurent Blanc was the trainer.114 The previous year, the same newspaper declared that 
the recurring elimination in the quarterfinals showed the limits of Qatar’s project.115  
Unfair competition 
- Financial 
The disrespect of the Financial Fair Play (FFP) is an important topic in Le Monde and L'Équipe. 
As it related to the agreements between PSG and QTA, this topic was developed in 2013 and 
2014. The club is portrayed as cheating on the rules implemented by the UEFA. For Le Monde, 
the problem for the agreements between PSG and QTA lies in the common majority stakeholder 
of both entities, which is the state of Qatar.116 The second critical issue according to Le Monde 
lies in the agreements themselves. Through the agreement, QTA was supposed to sponsor PSG 
up to 200 million euros per season, while the biggest sponsorship agreement for a European 
football club at that moment concerned Manchester United and Chevrolet, with an agreement 
representing 65 million euros per season.117 Le Monde mentioned apparent pressures from other 
European clubs to sanction PSG, and more specifically by mentioning the German club Bayern 
Munich. Interestingly enough, L'Équipe published a short article more than a year before, in 
which the newspaper quotes the president of Bayern Munich Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, where 
he asks for PSG to not cheat on the FFP.118 He also claimed that “the image of Qatar suffers 
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dramatically because of its involvement in PSG”.119 In April 2014, Jean-Claude Blanc120 gave 
an interview in L'Équipe, where he defended the sponsorship deal by mentioning the concept 
of ‘nation branding’.121 Blanc acknowledged that the agreement could be questioned when he 
declared that “people are allowed to ask questions since this contract is the first one in its kind 
and represent an important amount”.122  
- Sporting 
The domination of PSG in domestic competitions also contributed to the press presenting the 
Qatari involvement in PSG as negative. While the club was not able to win the Ligue 1 in the 
first year after the purchase of the club, the successive successes of the club in French 
competitions led to Le Monde writing two articles questioning the benefits of having major 
investors in French football. It is made clear in the title “Football: How PSG killed the Ligue 
1”123 and mostly subtilty in the title “PSG and Monaco will harm the Ligue 1, according the 
boss of German football”.124 Le Monde points out in both articles how unbalanced the league 
became with the development of the Parisian team. The substantial lead of PSG in the league 
so early in the season made the newspaper say the objective was not domestic but European. 
Le Monde mentioned the president of a French club competing in the Ligue, who declared that 
French football was going through a crisis despite PSG’s success.125 This point was also made 
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by the head of the German league in an interview reported by Le Monde. According to him, the 
main risks lie in the artificial input of money in clubs such as PSG and Monaco.126  
Corruption  
Qatar is linked with different affairs related to corruption between 2011 and 2017 in the French 
press. While these affairs are mainly concerning domestic issues within the FIFA and the 
UEFA, Le Monde and L'Équipe linked these affairs with Qatar. Qatar is indeed linked to two 
major corruption-related affairs: the attribution of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to the emirate, 
and the power struggle between Sepp Blatter127 and Michel Platini.128 These issues are not 
directly related to Qatar’s involvement in PSG; however, its involvement in these affairs is 
related to Qatar’s broader strategy of investing in football. The first aspect of this chapter, the 
so-called ‘Qatargate’, a terminology used by Le Monde which can be considered as a reference 
to the ‘Watergate’, is mostly concerned with struggles between the FIFA and France. However, 
while Qatar is portrayed by Le Monde as having used the ways which the FIFA allowed, the 
emirate is linked with this affair with matters of corruption.  
- ‘Qatargate’ 
Noticeably, the attribution of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar was portrayed as a clear 
political move by the FIFA, involving an explicit involvement of France in the process. It was 
developed in L'Équipe with articles mentioning public disagreements between Sepp Blatter and 
Nicolas Sarkozy. In its articles “FIFA: Blatter clarifies his accusation against Platini and 
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Sarkozy” and “FIFA: Nicolas Sarkozy replies to Sepp Blatter”, the newspaper outlined the 
political struggle between the former French head of state and the football organisation. Qatar 
is not presented as an active actor in these articles, but rather as an actor who used its 
connections with Sarkozy to obtain its objective. It is explicit in the sentence “The hypothesis 
of a pressure of Nicolas Sarkozy, close to the emir of Qatar, on Michel Platini is nothing 
new”.129 While the issue at stake is not directly related to PSG, both Le Monde and L'Équipe 
mention a meeting at the Elysée Palace where Nicolas Sarkozy would have pressured Michel 
Platini to vote for Qatar for the attribution of the World Cup while representatives of the emirate 
were also present in addition to the former president of PSG at the period. The reunion is set to 
have occurred six months before the purchase of the club by QSI, on November 23rd 2010. Le 
Monde argued that the purchase of PSG was the result of France supporting Qatar’s candidacy 
for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.130 Qatar is indeed perceived as the country which bribed 
members of FIFA’s executive board to win the right to host the major sporting event. Le Monde 
mentions the suspension of Qatari Mohammed Bin Hammam due to corruption.131 
Qatar is here portrayed as the chief troublemaker, while using the flaws of the FIFA 
organisation to reach its objective. Le Monde mentions Luc Dayan who is presented as being 
close to the Qatari authorities who stated “the Qataris have only applied historical methods of 
this environment. The shortcomings and the incoherencies of sports governance are 
permanently exploited”.132  
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Le Monde and L'Équipe portrayed the corruption scandal related to the attribution to the 
2022 FIFA World Cup with the power struggle within the FIFA between Michel Platini and 
Sepp Blatter.  
- Platini-Blatter 
One of the main aspects of the ‘Qatargate’, according to Le Monde and L'Équipe, was the 
connection between Qatar and Michel Platini. While both newspapers developed heavily on the 
personal litigation between Platini and Blatter, the connection between Platini and Qatar 
changed the image of both the emirate and Platini. Le Monde made a headline concerning it, 
assuming that the personal struggle between the two politicians was at the root of the 
‘Qatargate’, with the title “Behind the ‘Qatargate’, the war Blatter-Platini”.133 The article starts 
by mentioning “the big corruption suspicions which continue to grow on Qatar since the small 
emirate obtained, on December 2nd 2010, the organisation of the 2022 World Cup.”134  Qatar 
is presented as a weapon for Blatter to use against Platini,135 supporting the idea of Platini being 
corrupted or being under pressure by both France and Qatar.  
Corruption and Qatar started headlining during the 2012/2013 season with the article from 
Le Monde titled “This ‘Qatargate’ which shakes FIFA’.136 However, the topic continued to be 
part of the press reports until the 2015/2016 season. It was due to the official candidacy of 
Michel Platini during this particular season whereas the previous season was concerned with 
backroom talks.  
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Disrespect of perceived “French traditions” 
Qatar is portrayed as being an outsider actor in French domestic affairs. While the concept of 
‘French values’ remains vague and is open to discussion, the arrival of Qatar in French daily 
affairs led to events which were perceived as diverging from traditional French ‘ways’ of 
managing situations. It also put lights on situations occurring in Qatar being judged by French 
newspapers through a French lens.  
- Lists of ultras 
Le Monde reported the existence of lists of supporters made by the club, which forbade them 
from entering the stadium. 137 While the title of the article already mentions the illegality of 
such decisions, the article develops on the arbitrary aspect of the decision.138 The main reason 
for these supporters to be blacklisted as such is apparently to have criticised the Qatari 
administration of the club. 139 The fact that the administration of the club justifies this policy140 
makes this aspect reflect poorly on Qatar. While the administration of the club is entitled to 
decide who is allowed to enter the premises of the stadium, supporters were forbidden to do so 
because of political contestation which goes against the concept of free-speech.  
- Club identity 
The arrival of Qatari investors made the press wonder about the club identity. Indeed, 
discussions related to the potential transfer of the team to another stadium,141 the change of 
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logo, and the potential renaming of the club to put a more significant emphasis on the city of 
Paris in the club142 gave a negative image of the emirate. 143 
  While the situation with the club ultras and more traditional supporters saw an 
improvement between 2011 and 2017, as it is shown in a previous chapter of this research, the 
situation escalated between them and the Qatari administration.  
The division between old supporters and the club is illustrated by a supporter quoted by 
Le Monde when he declares: “I am disgusted by PSG. They fire Kombouaré. We are losing the 
Parc. We are breaking the Kop. We bought Beckham. It is not Paris, it is Disneyland”. 144 This 
point was also mentioned when Le Monde reported the riots which occurred on the Trocadero 
square after PSG winning its domestic championship in 2013. Le Monde argued that “hundreds 
of supporters deplore QSI’s temptation of getting rid of the club’s history.” 145 In the same 
article, the reporter quotes a former president of a supporter association who argued that “there 
is a complete absence of counter-forces, a loss of the values and soul of the club”.146  
The problem concerning the supporters and the atmosphere within the stadium is also 
reflected in two articles from Le Monde.147 The club is indeed presented as having ordered 
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supporters to bring a louder atmosphere in the stadium. While these aspects were done by the 
supporters directly before 2010, the club seems to be willing to force itself to be presented as a 
more active football entity during games. The administration is thus directly ordering accredited 
supporters to bring a new ambience in the Parc des Princes rather than creating incentives for 
supporters to do so. The administration of the club thus creates a feeling of an artificial, or at 
least forced, new identity of the club. The objective seems to restore the positive parts of the 
past of the club and to add it to the elements brought with the new administration since 2011 to 
create a modern and fashionable identity of the club.  
Conclusion: The Limits of State Branding 
The results of Qatar’s investments in France through PSG are complex when looked through 
the lens of state branding. The financial and sporting development of PSG has to be 
acknowledged. The involvement of Qatar in the process is therefore successful in this aspect. 
Based on the logic mentioned in the methodology section of this paper, the state branding of 
Qatar should be considered as successful. The author of this research paper indeed mentioned 
a positive correlation between the development of the company branding of PSG and the state 
branding of Qatar in the methodology section of this paper. The logic behind this correlation 
was as follow: since the football club was wholly owned by a subpart of Qatar’s sovereign 
wealth fund, QSI, and the purchase of the club was entirely driven by the state branding strategy 
of Qatar (Thani and Heenan 1019), the successful branding of PSG would imply the successful 
state branding of Qatar. The opposite would also then apply with a negative branding of PSG 
leading to a negative state branding of Qatar. This model would make PSG merely a tool of 
Qatar’s sports diplomacy.  
However, the results of this research show the limits of this model. While PSG was 
fortunate in the development of its brand, it did not lead to a clear positive state branding of 
Qatar in France. The positive economic development of PSG did not lead to a certain positive 
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development of the perception of Qatar in France. While being based on the model previously 
mentioned, the research showed that branding was not necessarily related to the economic 
results of an entity. Instead, as it is developed by Dinnie, branding, be it company- or state-
centred, is concerned with the perception of how promises, which are advertised, are respected 
(16). For PSG, the success of the branding of the club and Qatar is dependent on several aspects. 
Firstly, by purchasing and investing in PSG, Qatar brought attention to itself and saw French 
media paying more attention to the internal characteristics of the emirate. Secondly, by using 
the only major football club in Paris and the surrounding region, the success of Qatar’s state 
branding is depended on local factors. The five years before the purchase of the club by QSI 
saw different groups of supporters indeed fight each other on what appeared to be political 
motives.148 The results of the research on the perception of Qatar through the lens of PSG in 
the two newspapers Le Monde and L'Équipe were characterised by these two main aspects.  
 Qatar was successful in its branding in France on at least three topics. The French press 
through Le Monde and L'Équipe portrayed both PSG and Qatar as successful on the symbolic 
value of the acquisition of the club, the acquisition of specific leading figures such as David 
Beckham and Zlatan Ibrahimovic, and the progressive reintegration of ultras and historic 
supporters within the stadium and therefore in the daily life of the club. Like this final point, 
which illustrates a sign of progress in the perception of the club and its Qatari administration, 
the acquisition of the club by QSI led to interrogations within French politics on the nature and 
the objectives of Qatar by doing so. However, the public behaviour of certain personalities 
related to the club, such as Nasser Al-Khelaïfi and Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, gave the 
acquisition of the club a positive image and showed the willingness of Qatar to adapt to French 
living traditions or habits. While Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was responsible for the purchase 
of the club when he was not yet the Emir of Qatar, he continued being implicated in the 
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perception of the club and its daily life. It was made clear in an article from L'Équipe which 
mentioned how the emir invited the presidents of the other clubs of the Ligue 1 to the tennis 
tournament Roland Garros.149 However, Nasser Al-Khelaïfi remained the Qatari public figure 
associated with the club. While Qatar had been associated by specific political figures such as 
Bruno Le Maire and François Fillon,150 the president of PSG took part in the commemoration 
walk after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, next to heads of states and governments.151 The purchase 
of specific football figures such as David Beckham and Zlatan Ibrahimović also helped Qatar 
to beneficiate from a positive image in France. While Ibrahimović headlined because of 
numerous controversial public declarations, the acquisition of such figures for the club helped 
Qatar to be portrayed as a sincere actor willing to spend as much as needed to develop the brand 
and team of PSG.  
Nevertheless, the arrival of Qatar in PSG, and therefore also in France’s domestic 
affairs, led to the negative portrayal of the emirate. The first aspect is directly related to state 
branding strategy: communication. The administration was indeed not able to handle certain 
internal affairs to the club which led to a negative coverage of the club by Le Monde and 
L'Équipe. The predominant example remains the ‘Aurier Affair’ in which a player insulted his 
trainer and several players. While it gave a negative perception of the club, the fact that the 
administration let the player play and represent the team during a crucial game for the club in 
the Champions League showed that the club was not willing to stand up for itself. Another 
significant aspect which led to a negative coverage of the club was the apparent lack of Fair-
play. This topic should be divided into two subtopics: a lack of fair play in domestic 
competitions and a lack of respect for the Financial Fair Play implemented by the UEFA. The 
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sporting success of the club in domestic competitions led to a negative coverage and to 
interrogations concerning the relative benefits for France to have such a club. The struggles 
between the club and the UEFA concerning the Financial Fair Play also negatively impacted 
the image of Qatar in France. Le Monde reported on how the questions of Qatar self-sponsoring 
its club through its tourism authority represented a violation of the Financial Fair Play. This last 
point relates to two other aspects which had unfavourable repercussions on the portrayal of 
Qatar in France. The involvement of Qatar in French affairs led to media looking more closely 
at the domestic situation of Qatar. Le Monde and L'Équipe looked at how the emirate was 
treating its foreign workers and football players and reported negatively about these two 
aspects. The last aspect concerning the apparently failed state branding of Qatar in France 
concerning the corruption-related topics of the attribution of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to the 
emirate and the struggle between Blatter and Platini for the head of the football organisation. 
In both cases, Qatar is not depicted as the main antagonist but is still presented as an actor 
willing to pressure or bribe pivotal actors to obtain its deed.  
Qatar’s state branding in France cannot be considered as entirely successful based on 
these findings. However, as Dinnie outlined, there is no precise definition of state branding 
since the concept appears to be recent in academic research (13). If one takes the aspect related 
to state branding which consists of making people aware of the country, then Qatar has been 
successful. However, when looking at the definition which consists of giving the country a 
more attractive image abroad, then Qatar has failed to do so in France with PSG. One question 
which can be asked based on these findings is whether France was the audience Qatar tried to 
reach to with investing in PSG. The Times indeed pretended not to know that there was a 
football club in Paris before the arrival of Qatari investors,152 whereas PSG was already a well-
established brand in France before 2011. Future research could be made concerning the 
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development of the image of PSG abroad, either on a European level since the club competes 
in European competitions or on a global level since PSG became a global brand since the arrival 
of several key players such as Beckham and Ibrahimović. Based on the same model linking 
company branding with state branding, Qatar’s state branding through PSG could be considered 
as successful if the club is portrayed positively by media in different countries. The question of 
the audience which a state hopes to reach is not developed extensively in the literature. It is 
indeed assumed that the targeted audience is the one from the host country whereas the impacts 
of the developments of an actor in a particular country might lead to a change of perception of 
this actor in another country. Therefore, the case of PSG in the context of Qatar’s state branding 
remains relevant for future research.  
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